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THE JUROR’S SACRED OATH: IS THERE A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PROPERLY SWORN JURY? 
Kathleen M. Knudsen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Within hours of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upholding 
a conviction by an unsworn jury,1 news stories questioning the deci-
sion began to populate the Internet.  Articles such as, “Does a Jury 
Oath Really Matter?”2 and “You Forgot to Swear In the Jury? No 
Prob”3 were published, reposted, and discussed as bloggers and 
commentators alike struggled to make sense of a decision that seem-
ingly undermined almost a millennia of jury procedural history. 
The modern American conception of a jury trial has its roots 
as far back as the twelfth century,4 originating from a blend of Roman 
law,5 Germanic law,6 and Canon law.7  The earliest forerunners of 
modern jurors were men of the community with general knowledge 
about the defendant who were called as “oath-helpers” or compurga-
 
* J.D. Regent University School of Law. B.S.B.A. Thomas Edison State University. Thank 
you to Maria Lanahan for her inspiration on this topic, to Professor James Duane for his in-
valuable suggestions throughout the writing process, to Associate Dean Lynne Marie Kohm 
for her academic and personal mentorship, and to my sister Renee Knudsen for her encour-
agement while researching and writing this article.  
1 United States v. Turrietta, 696 F.3d 972, 973 (10th Cir. 2012). 
2 Robyn Hagan Cain, Does a Jury Oath Really Matter?, FINDLAW 10TH CIR. NEWS AND 
INFO. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/tenth_circuit/2012/08/does-
a-jury-oath-really-matter.html. 
3 Joe Palazzolo, You Forgot to Swear In the Jury? No Prob, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug. 
29, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/08/29/you-forgot-to-swear-in-the-jury-
no-prob. 
4 Turrietta, 696 F.3d at 980-81; CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION 
OF A DOCTRINE 240 (1998). 
5 Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1337 (1959). 
6 Id. at 1340. 
7 Id. at 1343. 
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tors to testify under oath to the defendant’s veracity.8  Upon this oath, 
the defendant would be declared innocent of the charge.9  The word 
“juror” identifies an individual who took an oath, a “swearer.”10  
From this beginning, the modern petit jury trial developed.11 
Based on centuries of common law procedural history, the ju-
ror’s oath arrived in America with hardly a ripple.12  Colonial juris-
prudence considered it a basic assumption that a jury would be 
sworn.13  When a question arose over whether the jury had been 
sworn, the Supreme Court held that it was assumed that a “duly 
sworn” jury had been given the proper oath.14 Constitutional protec-
tions, such as the Fifth Amendment guarantee against a defendant be-
ing put in jeopardy twice for the same offense15 and the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of an “impartial” jury,16 have been explicitly 
defined by the Supreme Court with the assumption that the jury is 
sworn.17  Yet, despite its prevalence, practice, and significance, in 
over two hundred years the juror’s oath has never been explicitly 
codified in the U.S. Constitution, federal statute, or in eight states,18 
leaving its necessity to be questioned.19 
This Article will argue that the trial procedure of swearing20 
the jury, with its long judicial tradition and explicit functional signifi-
cance for constitutional rights, is an implied constitutional require-
 
8 JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INTUITIONS 21 (2009). 
9 WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 62 (1875). 
10 Juror, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Juror (last visited Apr. 
4, 2016); LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 38. 
11 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 622-23 (2d ed. 1898). 
12 CONRAD, supra note 4, at 243. 
13 Journals of the Continental Congress: Wednesday, October 26, 1774, LIBRARY OF 
CONG. AM. MEMORY PROJECT, https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00142)) (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) [here-
inafter LIBRARY OF CONG.]. 
14 Baldwin v. Kansas, 129 U.S. 52, 55 (1889). 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 2. 
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 2. 
17 Martinez v. Illinois, 134 S. Ct. 2070, 2075 (2014) (holding that jeopardy attaches when 
the jury is sworn); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171 (1950) (holding that an impar-
tial jury is one that can honor their oath). 
18 The other forty-two states have explicitly codified their criminal petit jury oath.  See 
infra Appendix: State Statutes on Oaths of the Criminal Petit Jury. 
19 Cain, supra note 2; Palazzolo, supra note 3. 
20 Unless otherwise specified, throughout this Article the concept of a juror’s “oath” will 
be interchangeable with that of an “affirmation.” 
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ment.  However, this procedural requirement may be forfeited by the 
failure of counsel to object at trial, and does not rise to the level of 
plain error on appeal.  Part I of this Article will present the broad his-
toric background of oaths in society, distinguish between various ju-
risdictions’ use of the modern jury oath, and outline the essential pro-
cedural elements of a proper jury oath.  Part II will analyze the five 
reasons that the juror’s oath is constitutionally required and why it is 
functionally important to the jury trial.  Part III will outline the five 
major types of errors that occur in swearing the jury and provide a 
framework for evaluating whether an error in swearing the jury mer-
its reversal on appeal. 
As with many procedural protections, the criminal trial proce-
dure of properly swearing a jury is an often unnoticed but neverthe-
less vital facilitator of the constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy and the guarantee of an impartial jury. 
I. AS GOD IS MY WITNESS 
A. The History of Oaths in Culture 
Oaths have permeated human history.  In ancient Greece, the 
oath “[held] democracy together,” and affected religion, morality, po-
litical organization, and civil and criminal law.21 From the first chap-
ters of Genesis, the Jewish Torah and the Christian Old Testament are 
replete with references to oaths.22  Jewish culture used oaths for a va-
riety of societal functions,23 including binding friendships,24 making 
sales,25 sealing treaties,26 and arranging marriages.27 Similar, though 
not identical, to the Jewish use of oaths, Islam gives a thorough 
 
21 WALTER BURKERT, GREEK RELIGION: ARCHAIC AND CLASSICAL 250-54 (John Raffan ed. 
& trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1985). 
22 The first recorded oath is Jehovah swearing to mankind that He will never again curse 
the world or purge it with a flood. Genesis 8:21; Isaiah 54:9.  From that point, God is rec-
orded making oaths to man, Genesis 24:7, swearing by His own name, Jeremiah 44:26, or 
swearing by Himself, Hebrews 6:13. 
23 Swearing was an important obligation and bound a man to perform what he promised. 
Numbers 30:2.  Oaths were taken with uplifted hand, Deuteronomy 32:40, in the name of the 
God of Israel. Isaiah 48:1; Isaiah 65:16. 
24 1 Samuel 20:42. 
25 Genesis 25:33. 
26 Genesis 21:22. 
27 Genesis 24. 
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checklist for swearing a valid oath or “qasam”28 and discourages false 
oaths unless they are obligatory.29 
The feudal system depended on oaths of fealty, predecessor to 
the medieval notions of chivalry.30  In the Middle Ages, the Canon 
law and European Christendom used oaths as the predominant means 
of maintaining social order.31  “Oaths undergirded virtually every as-
pect of society—in rural areas, in university, in pledging fealty to 
lords and kings, in commercial settings, as well as in the courts.”32  In 
America today, the oath continues to be used by society as a way to 
legally empower individuals to fulfill official functions and to moral-
ly motivate those individuals in the performance of their duties. 
Oaths33 are “a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing 
to God. . .that one’s statement is true or that one will be bound to a 
promise.”34  It is “any form of attestation by which a person is bound 
in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully.”35  This 
promise invokes a deity to be a witness to the oath36 and invites di-
vine punishment if the promise is broken or the testimony is false.37  
 
28 Nadhr, Qasm, Ahad - Oath / Vow, ISLAMIC-LAWS.COM, http://www.islamic-
laws.com/oath.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).  The oath must be (1) by someone who was 
mentally “sane,” (2) voluntary, (3) for a permissible act, (4) sworn to in one of the names of 
Allah, (5) done verbally (though exceptions apply if the person is mute), and (6) given with 
the capacity to fulfill the oath.  Id. 
29 ISLAMIC-LAWS.COM, supra note 28, at 2684 (“[T]o make a false oath in the cases of dis-
pute is a major sin.  However, if a person takes a false oath in order to save himself, or an-
other Muslim from the torture of an oppressor, there is no objection in it, in fact, at times it 
becomes obligatory.”). 
30 THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 106-07, 110, 
114 (5th ed. 1956) (noting that the “ceremonial oath of fidelity” was the common link be-
tween Germanic warrior clan tradition in the fifth and sixth centuries and feudal culture cen-
turies later); THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THIRD THOMAS EDITION §4.05 (David A. 
Thomas eds., 2015) (“The tie between lord and vassal was established by the act of homage 
and oath of fealty . . . The bond thus established was perhaps the most important social tie in 
northern Europe (including England) throughout the Dark Ages and the medieval period.”). 
31 Virgil Wiebe, Oath Martyrs (U. of St. Thomas Legal Stud. Res. Paper, Paper No. 11-
28, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1932505. 
32 Id. at 17. 
33 Oath, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/oath (last visited Apr. 
14, 2016).  The word “oath” has two very different meanings: one in which the speaker is 
making a solemn promise and the other in which the speaker is making a rude or profane 
comment.  In the context of this article, the word “oath” will always refer to the first type of 
usage. 
34 Oath, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
35 People v. Pribble, 249 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976). 
36 Steve Sheppard, What Oaths Meant to the Framers’ Generation: A Preliminary Sketch, 
2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 273, 279 (2009). 
37 Oath, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34. 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/4
2016 JUROR’S SACRED OATH 493 
The oath does not create an obligation; it merely strengthens the 
preexisting social obligation “by uniting it with that of religion.”38  
For example, the witness on the stand has a preexisting social obliga-
tion to tell the truth and the judge on the bench has a preexisting so-
cial duty to uphold the law—the oath of office merely formalizes that 
obligation.39 
Oaths have a stabilizing effect on society for various reasons.  
Oaths solemnize important occasions,40 create legally binding state-
ments,41 act as “instruments of investigation in courts of justice,”42 
and subject the swearer to the penalties of perjury for intentionally 
giving a false oath.43  They impose “a solemn obligation upon the 
minds of all reflecting men, and especially upon those, who feel a 
deep sense of accountability to a Supreme being”44 and function as a 
guarantee that the swearer “will be conscientious in the discharge of 
his duty.”45 
Oaths may be either testimonial or promissory.  Testimonial 
oaths occur when an individual swears to testify to something, such 
as a witness swearing to tell “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth.”46  By contrast, in a promissory oath the swearer prom-
ises to do something. Promissory oaths pervade culture,47 affecting 
 
38 I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *369. 
39 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at 369. 
40 Joseph Story, Commentaries On The Constitution (1833), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a6_3s27.html. 
41 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 2. 
42 President George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796) (transcript available 
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp). 
43 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2015). 
44 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 1. 
45 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 1. 
46 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 269 (6th ed. Mar. 
2013) [hereinafter DISTRICT JUDGE BENCHBOOK]. 
47 See, e.g., Definition of Hippocratic Oath, MEDICINENET.COM, 
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=20909 (last visited on Apr. 18, 
2016); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (oath of office for United States Representatives and Sena-
tors); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2015) (oath of office for government officers); 10 U.S.C. § 502(a) 
(2015) (oath of enlistment for the military); 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (2016) (oath of citizenship for 
new Americans); Rescue Policy 1117 Oath of Office, WEST VALLEY FIRE-RESCUE, 
http://www.westvalleyfire.com/default.asp?pageid=195&deptid=1 (last visited on Apr. 18, 
2016) (oath of service for firefighters); Code of Ethics for EMS Practitioners, NAT’L ASS’N 
OF EMERGENCY MED. TECHNICIANS, http://www.naemt.org/about_us/emtoath.aspx (last visit-
ed Mar. 31, 2016) (oath of service for EMTs). 
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the adolescent Boy Scout48 to the United States President.49  They are 
used extensively in American courtrooms, with the judge, the clerk, 
the bailiff, the lawyers, and the jury all-swearing to fulfill specific ob-
ligations.50  Jurors are sworn twice51—”represent[ing] a solemn prom-
ise on the part of each juror to do his duty according to the dictates of 
the law to see that justice is done.”52  Before voir dire, the first oath 
requires the jurors to swear to answer questions truthfully.53  Given 
after jury selection and before the beginning of trial, the second oath 
requires jurors to swear that they will “well and truly try” the case 
and render a “true verdict” in accord with the law and the evidence.54 
B. Modern Jury Oaths 
While the specific language used differs among jurisdictions, 
“an oath is essential to install . . . a juror.  The oath is administered 
for a purpose, and the juror acts under the solemnity of his oath in his 
deliberations.”55  The oath is more than a mere formality required by 
tradition, it “represents a solemn promise on the part of each juror to 
do his duty according to the dictates of the law to see that justice is 
done.”56  And, “[t]his duty is not just a final duty to render a verdict 
in accordance with the law, but the duty to act in accordance with the 
law at all stages of trial.”57 
 
48 The Boy Scout Oath, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, 
http://www.scouting.org/scoutsource/BoyScouts.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). 
49 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
50 DISTRICT JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 46, at 265-70. 
51 Poll, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (noting that though not technically an 
oath, jurors may also be “polled” at the conclusion of the trial to verify that the verdict read 
by the jury foreperson is their own); see also Eugene R. Milhizer, So Help Me Allah: An His-
torical and Prudential Analysis of Oaths as Applied to the Current Controversy of the Bible 
and Quran in Oath Practices in America, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 22 (2009) (noting that Henrici 
de Bracton recorded that early English common law allowed defendants to require “jurors to 
swear an oath that their decision was just”). 
52 Pribble, 249 N.W.2d at 366 (emphasis added). 
53 DISTRICT JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 46, at 268 (Oath to venirepersons: “Do you 
solemnly swear [or affirm] that you will truthfully answer all questions that shall be asked of 
you regarding your qualifications as a juror in the case now called for trial, so help you 
God?”). 
54 Id. at 269.  Unless otherwise specified, throughout the remainder of this Article the oath 
referenced is the pre-trial oath. 
55 Siberry v. State, 33 N.E. 681, 684 (Ind. 1893). 
56 Pribble, 249 N.W.2d at 366. 
57 Id. 
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1. Prescribed-Oath Jurisdictions 
Despite moderate differences among jurisdictions, forty-two 
states have prescribed a juror oath for criminal trials either by statute 
or by procedural rule.58  Various states spell out the exact language of 
the oath, others dictate the various essential concepts, and others 
merely require that the jury be somehow sworn.59  Some prescribed 
oaths are concise60 while others are detailed.61 Certain state oaths 
stress the solemnity of the proceedings62 while others focus on the 
oath as a means to ensure the impartiality of the jurors’ deliberations 
and their decision.63  Examples of state jury oaths include: 
New Jersey: Do you swear or affirm that you will try the 
matter in dispute and give a true verdict according to the evidence?64 
Michigan: Each of you do solemnly swear (or affirm) that, in 
this action now before the court, you will justly decide the questions 
submitted to you, that, unless you are discharged by the court from 
further deliberation, you will render a true verdict, and that you will 
render your verdict only on the evidence introduced and in accord-
ance with the instructions of the court, so help you God.65 
North Carolina: Do you solemnly swear that you will con-
sider all the evidence in this case, follow the instructions given to 
you, deliberate fairly and impartially and reach a fair verdict?  So 
help you God.66 
Ohio: Do you swear or affirm that you will diligently inquire 
into and carefully deliberate all matters between the State of Ohio 
and the defendant (giving the defendant’s name)?  Do you swear or 
affirm you will do this to the best of your skill and understanding, 
without bias or prejudice?  So help you God.67 
While the exact language varies among jurisdictions, the es-
sential concepts of solemnity, a decision based on the evidence and 
the law, and fair or true verdict are consistent across jurisdictions. 
 
58 See infra Appendix: State Statutes on Oaths of the Criminal Petit Jury. 
59 Id. 
60 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:23-6 (West 2015). 
61 See, e.g., Mich. Ct. R. 2.511(H)(1) (2016). 
62 See N.D. R. CT. 6.10 (2016). 
63 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.28 (West 2015). 
64 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:23-6 (West 2015). 
65 Mich. Ct. R. 2.511(H)(1). 
66 N.D. R. CT. 6.10 (emphasis added). 
67 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.28 (West 2015) (emphasis added). 
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Many states retain some aspect of the classic oath language that asks 
jurors to solemnly swear to a “true verdict render according to the 
law and the evidence, so help you God.”68 
2. Tradition-Based Jurisdictions 
While most states have prescribed jury oaths, eight states69 
and the federal court system are based on common law, history, and 
traditional practice.70  Some of the states that have not codified the 
oath have explicitly recognized it in their judicial decisions,71 ex-
plaining that “[w]hile there is no explicit statute or rule requiring the 
administration of an oath to a jury in this state, the need for such an 
oath had been judicially recognized . . . [O]ur rules of criminal pro-
cedure implicitly require that a jury will be sworn.”72  This implicit 
recognition is often found in statutory guidelines for alternate juror 
procedures.  Statutes in various state and federal common law juris-
dictions may include a reference to the juror’s oath by specifying that 
the alternate jurors “shall take the same oath . . . as the regular ju-
rors.”73  Some such statutes also explicitly refer to the swearing of the 
main jury panel by providing that an alternate juror may be substitut-
ed “at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the ren-
dition of its verdict.”74 
While not statutorily codified, the District Court Judge’s 
Benchbook recommends that the following oath be administered to 
jurors before a federal criminal trial: “Do each of you solemnly swear 
[or affirm] that you will well and truly try, and a true deliverance 
make in, the case now on trial, and render a true verdict according to 
 
68 TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 35.22 (West 2015). 
69 See infra Appendix: Criminal Petit Jury Oaths. 
70 United States v. Pinero, 948 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1991) (“We note at the outset that 
it is not clear from the caselaw whether juries in the federal court system are required to be 
sworn in.  Certainly, that is the standard practice.”); U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. D. OF PENN., 
CLERK’S OFFICE PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK 104 (2014) (“Some additional duties performed by 
courtroom deputy clerks are . . . impaneling the jury and administering oaths to jurors.”). 
71 Minich v. People, 9 P. 4, 11 (Colo. 1885). 
72 Hollis v. People, 630 P.2d 68, 69 (Colo. 1981); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 47(i) (codify-
ing Colorado’s civil jury oath). 
73 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-105 (West 2014); see, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-
3 (West 2016) (“Alternate jurors shall . . . take the same oath and shall have the same func-
tions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(2)(A) 
(“Alternate jurors must have the same qualifications and be selected and sworn in the same 
manner as any other juror.”). 
74 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35 (Consol. 2016). 
8
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the law and the evidence, so help you God?”75  This wording of the 
recommended federal oath, like the language of oaths in the states 
still adhering to the un-codified common law oath, has been fairly 
consistent decade to decade76 and bears a striking resemblance to 
oaths given in the common law courts of English kings, including the 
promise of a “true verdict” according to the evidence.77 
3. Constitutional Challenges 
One of the most significant juridical analyses of juror oaths 
has been over their religious nature.  From early challenges by Quak-
ers78 to subsequent challenges by atheists, the constitutionality of the 
jury oath has been evaluated in light of the Constitution’s Article 
Five clause prohibiting religious “test oaths”79 and the First Amend-
 
75 DISTRICT JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 46, at 269. 
76 See U.S. DIST. CT. FOR D.C., A MANUAL FOR COURTROOM CLERKS (1975) (“Do you and 
each of you solemnly swear that you will well and truly try and a true deliverance make be-
tween the United States and ____, the defendant at the bar, and a true verdict render accord-
ing to the evidence, so help you God?”). 
77 State v. Ballen, 510 S.E.2d 226, 227–28 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998). 
78 Due to “the growth of religious tolerance and the necessity of permitting Quakers, un-
believers, and atheists to testify as witnesses, England first permitted Quakers to affirm . . . ” 
instead of swear as early as 1688 and subsequently granted to all “unbelievers and athe-
ists . . . the right of affirmation as witnesses.”  State v. Dudikoff, 145 A. 655, 657 (Conn. 
1929).  The American states were “somewhat slower than England in adopting [these] more 
liberal provisions.”  Id. at 658.  Similar to their English counterparts, the Quakers in Colonial 
America objected to taking oaths because it violated their religious beliefs.  State v. Putnam, 
1 N.J.L. 260, 260 (1794).  Accordingly, American Quakers were given an exclusive excep-
tion to “affirm” instead of swear. Id.  However, by the turn of the twentieth century, the ex-
ception had expanded to allow anyone who objected to the religious nature of the oath, in-
cluding atheists, to affirm under penalty of perjury instead of swearing.  Dudikoff, 145 A. at 
658.  Today, the option of affirmation instead of oath has been officially codified in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, FED. R. EVID. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. CIV. P. 43, 
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, FED. R. CRIM. P. 1.  Violation of either affir-
mation or oath is perjury. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2015) 
79 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; Jonathan Belcher, Religion-Plus-Speech: The Constitutionali-
ty of Juror Oaths and Affirmations Under the First Amendment, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
287, 301 (1992).  In the United States, controversy over whether oaths were constitutional 
under the “test” clause has notably arisen after major military conflicts such as the Civil War 
and World War II.  For example, concern over southern sympathizers inspired Congress to 
pass the “Ironclad Test Oath.”  History of the Oath of Office, U.S. SENATE 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Oath_Office.htm (last visited 
April 18, 2016).  Signed into law on July 2, 1862, the oath required anyone elected or ap-
pointed to the United States government, with the exception of the president, to “swear or 
affirm that they had never previously engaged in criminal or disloyal conduct.”  Id.  States 
followed the federal government’s lead and imposed similar requirements.  However, by 
1867, the Supreme Court struck down such oaths as ex post facto laws, Cummings v. Mis-
9
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ment protections in the Free Exercise Clause80 and the Establishment 
Clause.81  Today, jurors have the option to make an affirmation in-
stead of taking the oath.82  Similar to phrases such as “God save the 
United States and this honorable court” and “one nation under God” 
in the Pledge of Allegiance,83 the phrase “so help me God” in a ju-
ror’s oath does not constitute an impermissible establishment of reli-
gion, as long as jurors have the option of affirming instead of swear-
ing.84 
C. Essential Procedural Characteristics 
Properly swearing the jury must be done with precise timing, 
with the defendant present, with solemnity in form, and with all of 
the essential elements in the language of the oath itself. 
The proper swearing process has both timing and presence re-
quirements.  Jurors should be sworn immediately after voir dire and 
immediately before the trial begins.85  “Swearing the jury immediate-
ly prior to the trial serves to emphasize the importance and the seri-
ousness of the juror’s task, and ensures that each juror is indeed 
 
souri, 71 U.S. 277, 330 (1866), and bills of attainder, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 381 
(1866).  Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court continued to strike down loyalty oaths, 
holding that an Indiana statute requiring an oath as a qualification for placement on the ballot 
for state elections was invalid.  Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 450 
(1974). 
80 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2; Belcher, supra note 79, at 305. 
81 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1; Belcher, supra note 79, at 302. 
82 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2015) (“‘[O]ath’ includes affirmation”); see also Edward B. Lozowicki, 
Comment, The California Grand Juror's Oath: A Religious Test, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
232, 232 (1968) (“California has attempted to obviate the religious oath problem both consti-
tutionally and statutorily.  Besides the non-theistic form of oath provided in the state consti-
tution, the codes provide for petit jury oaths which make no reference to a deity.”). 
83 Belcher, supra note 79, at 303-04. 
84 Belcher, supra note 79, at 301 (“The fact that juror oaths may contain the words ‘sol-
emnly swear’ and ‘So help me God’ does not amount to a requirement of belief in God.”); 
see Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014) (noting that the Pledge 
of Allegiance, inaugural prayer, and opening court sessions with “God save the United States 
and this honorable Court” were not violations of the establishment clause); Craig v. State, 
480 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (stating as long as the statute is construed to 
allow jurors to affirm instead of swear, there is no constitutional violation); but see Torcaso 
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (holding that requiring belief in God for public service 
was a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Schowgurow v. State, 213 A.2d 
475, 482 (Md. 1965) (holding that any “requirement of an oath as to such belief [in God], or 
inquiry of prospective jurors, oral or written, as to whether they believe in a Supreme Being, 
is unconstitutional”). 
85 United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1358 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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sworn before he or she hears any evidence.”86 The oath should be 
administered to the jury in the presence of the defendant because the 
“defendant should be accorded the assurance that the jurors have 
been sworn to try his case by observing them sworn.”87  This “de-
fendant present” requirement caused one federal circuit court to im-
plicitly consider the juror’s oath itself as a procedural requirement.88 
The form of the oath should generally be designed to impress 
upon the swearer’s conscience the solemnity of the act that he is 
about to undertake.89  To the religiously conscious, such an oath is 
“esteemed the most solemn appeal to God.”90  For others, the formali-
ty of the oath and the resulting civic duty is deeply compelling as a 
matter of personal integrity.91  And, despite people disagreeing on 
whether jurors are obligated to follow the law as explained by the 
judge or can decide the case merely on the evidence and their own 
moral judgment (i.e. “jury nullification”), most people would agree 
that the juror’s oath entrusts the jury with a sacred duty to make a 
“true verdict” and not to carelessly make a decision regarding the de-
fendant’s guilt.92 
Proper essential elements of the oath include exhorting jurors 
on their sacred duty93 to render a “true verdict”94 according to (1) the 
law95 and (2) the evidence as presented in court.96  In cases of juror 
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1358–359; see also Baldwin, 129 U.S. at 55 (agreeing with the Supreme Court of 
Kansas that it was “highly important and necessary that the oath should be administered . . . 
in the presence of the prisoner.”) (emphasis added). 
88 Pinero, 948 F.2d at 700 (Without directly addressing whether swearing was necessary, 
the Sixth Circuit recognized “the right of criminal defendants to have the jury receive its 
oath in their presence . . . ” leading the Eleventh Circuit to deduce that, “[p]resumably, then, 
the Sixth Circuit would deem the swearing of the jury a requirement.”).  Id. 
89 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (noting that, “[t]he 
form of oath universally prevailing, conclude[s] with an appeal to the Almighty.”). 
90 Id. at 468; Amy J. St. Eve et al., More From the #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and 
Social Media, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 64, 84-85 (2014). 
91 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 84-85. 
92 United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997) (evaluating jury nullification 
in light of the “juror’s sworn duty to follow the law” in a “society committed to the rule of 
law . . . ”). 
93 Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 468. 
94 See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 2.511(H)(1); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2B:23-6 (West 2015); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.22 (West 2015); DISTRICT JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 46, at 
269. 
95 Martin, 740 F.2d at 1358. 
96 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 398-99 (2010); UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 513 (1987) 
(“The court shall cause the jurors to be sworn or affirmed to try the case in a just and impar-
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oath irregularities, one of the “crucial consideration[s]” is that “[e]ach 
juror swore before trial to try all criminal cases well and truly accord-
ing to the laws of the United States.”97  Second, jurors must impar-
tially weigh the evidence presented within the courtroom.98 The jury 
“need not enter the box with empty heads” but must be able to “lay 
aside [their] impression[s] or opinion[s] and render a verdict based on 
the evidence presented in court.”99 
II. WHY SHOULD THE JURY BE PROPERLY SWORN? 
Disagreement over the necessity of the juror’s oath arises 
largely from different views of the purpose of the juror’s oath.100  
There are five reasons that a jury should be sworn—though courts 
rarely, if ever, clearly differentiate among or evaluate all five purpos-
es in an individual decision.  First, the historic definition of the word 
“juror” was someone who is “sworn.”101  Second, the Supreme Court 
has rested a constitutional analysis of an “impartial” jury for purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment on the jury being sworn.102  Third, the oath 
legally and morally motivates jurors to faithfully fulfill their duties.103  
Fourth, a sworn jury is essential to the legal formation of the jury.104  
Finally, the Supreme Court has held that the jury oath is the moment 
that jeopardy attaches for a double jeopardy analysis.105  For each of 
these reasons, it is imperative that a jury be properly sworn. 
A. Trial by Oath 
The origin of the word “jury” is traceable back to the Anglo-
French word “jurer,” which literally means “to swear,”106 and the Lat-
 
tial manner and according to the law and the evidence.”). 
97 Martin, 740 F.2d at 1358 (emphasis added). 
98 Skilling, 561 U.S. at 398-99. 
99 Id. (emphasis added). 
100 Cain, supra note 2, at 1; Palazzolo, supra note 3, at 1. 
101 Juror, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Juror (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2016). 
102 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 183-84 (1986). 
103 State v. Davis, 52 Vt. 376, 381 (1880). 
104 United States v. Green, 556 F.2d 71, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
105 Martinez, 134 S. Ct. 2070, 2074 (2014) (holding that jeopardy attaches at the oath). 
106 Jury, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jury (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 2016). 
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in word “iuro,” which means “to swear an oath.”107 According to an 
early 1900’s definition, a jury is “a body of men who are sworn to 
declare the facts of a case as they are proven from the evidence 
placed before them.”108  Over the last century that definition has not 
significantly changed.  The Federal Bar Association defines a jury as 
a group of individuals who have “sworn to inquire about matters of 
fact, and declare the truth from evidence presented.”109  Common 
themes to the definition of a jury include laypersons (non-legal pro-
fessionals), who through a selection process dictated by the law and 
upon taking the juror’s oath, have the power to determine the facts 
and make legal judgments in a court of law on a specific case.110 
1. A Thousand Years of Jury Oaths 
The jury trial developed from defendants’ belief that adjudica-
tion by a jury of their peers was a preferred substitute to trial by or-
deal or trial by battle.111  The jury was trusted because the oath placed 
upon them a sacred obligation that “link[ed] the conscience of man to 
God.”112 
Prior to the Norman conquest of 1066, English jurisprudence 
was local, largely unwritten,113 and based on an eclectic potpourri of 
practical necessity, custom, and religious beliefs.114  For example, 
some ancient cultures had allowed a “trial by oath” in which the de-
fendant would swear an oath, literally invoking divine judgment if he 
was guilty, and the plaintiff could be obligated to accept the defend-
 
107 Val D. Ricks, Contract Law and Christian Conscience, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 1004 
(2003). 
108 United States v. Marsh, 106 F. 474, 481 (5th Cir. 1901) (emphasis added). 
109 For The Media: Legal Definitions, FED. BAR ASS’N, http://www.fedbar.org/For-the-
Media/Legal-Definitions.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (emphasis added). 
110 Talesman, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/talesman (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).  Until a jury is selected, those 
summoned are called “talesman,” literally meaning “a member of a large pool of persons 
called for jury duty from which jurors are selected.”  Id. 
111 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 50. 
112 Milhizer, supra note 51, at 19-20. 
113 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION 85 (1983). 
114 Dale D. Goble, Three Cases / Four Tales: Commons, Capture, the Public Trust, and 
Property in Land, 35 ENVTL. L. 807, 821 (2005) (noting that the common law evolved out of 
agricultural necessity); Silving, supra note 5, at 1337 (noting that juridical paradigms on 
oaths were merged by Constantine as part of Christianity’s influence on the Roman Empire). 
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ant’s oath as the final determination of the case.115  Other “folk 
courts” dispensed rough, local justice and regularly accepted ordeal 
or battle as forms of proof for the defendant’s guilt.116  The modern 
jury trial developed as the common law was systematized and codi-
fied.117  Throughout this change, the juror’s oath was integral to the 
jury trial, with King Ethelred requiring Anglo-Saxon jurors as early 
as 1015 to swear “that they will condemn no man that is innocent, nor 
acquit any that is guilty.”118 
Early in the common law, defendants brought men of the 
community to swear to the veracity of the defendant’s oath, upon 
which the defendant could be declared innocent.119  In 1166, the As-
size of Clarendon created the “presentment jury,” in which influential 
community members were periodically summoned and required to 
offer indictments under oath against any local suspect of a criminal 
deed done in their community.120  The transition from the present-
ment jury to the trial jury was largely due to defendants’ request for 
 
115 Milhizer, supra note 51, at 8 (explaining that in Jewish, Babylonian, Roman, and Mus-
lim cultures an accusation or response by a party made under a “decisory” oath could suffice 
as an alternative for evidence in the case). 
116 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 50; see also Mike Macnair, Vicinage and the Ante-
cedents of the Jury, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 537, 539 (1999) (identifying judicial forums of 
proof in the early Middle Ages as “testimony, documents, compurgation, ordeal, or battle”). 
117 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 11, at 72 (explaining that the early “history of the 
jury took a turn which made our jurors, not witnesses, but judges of fact”); BERMAN, supra 
note 113, at 85 (noting prior to 1066, English law was not systematized); John F. Preis, In 
Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases, 22 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. 
J. 1, 7 (2013) (noting that the beginning of the English common law was in 1066 with the 
Norman Conquest). 
118 LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 80 (2004) (1852) (quoting 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *302). 
119 FORSYTH, supra note 9, at 62.  If the defendant could produce a sufficient number of 
compurgators, “he was entitled to an acquittal.” FORSYTH, supra note 9, at 62. This was be-
cause, 
[F]or, in the times of our Anglo-Saxon ancestors, such regard was paid 
to the sanctity of an oath, and such a repugnance was felt to the idea, that 
a man of good repute amongst his neighbors could be willfully forsworn, 
that if . . . he denied it on oath in a court of justice, and could get a cer-
tain number of persons to swear that they believed him, he had judgment 
given in his favor.   
FORSYTH, supra note 9, at 62-63. 
120 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 38 (explaining how the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 
created the “presentment jury,” which was responsible for initiating and resolving criminal 
charges against local defendants).  According to Henrici de Bracton, the presentment jurors 
swore to “speak the truth as to that on which you [the justices] shall question me on the lord 
king’s behalf, and for nothing will I fail so to do to the utmost of my power, so help me God 
and these holy relics.”  LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 39. 
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the jurors to decide the question of innocence or guilt instead of de-
termination by battle or ordeal.121  An 1898 essay noted that “the ver-
dict of jurors [became] a common mode of proof only because the lit-
igants ‘put themselves’ upon it. . . [The defendant] has asked for it, 
and by it he must stand or fall. . . for he has put himself upon their 
oath.”122 
Thus, without relinquishing the essential nature of putting ju-
rors under oath, the jury system evolved from jurors swearing to the 
defendant’s veracity, to jurors generating indictments upon their oath 
against the lawbreakers of their community, to, finally, defendants 
resting upon the fidelity of the jurors to their oath to truly try the facts 
and deliver a just verdict.  Ultimately, the English common law re-
tained all the elements of the jury’s responsibilities but split them into 
different groups: some people were sworn to bring an indictment 
(grand jury),123 some people were sworn to try the case (petit jury),124 
and some people were sworn to testify (witnesses).125 
By the eighteenth century, the petit jury was considered one 
of the “great rights” of Englishmen, and it was an uncontested as-
sumption that trial procedure included swearing the jurors.126  The 
trial transcript of the 1670 case against William Penn records a jury 
oath in essentially the final common law form.127  William Shake-
speare wrote of the jury as “the sworn twelve.”128  In 1713, Sir Mat-
thew Hale described the seventh step in a jury trial as the twelve ju-
rors being “sworn to try the same according to their Evidence.”129 
 
121 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 50.  The presentment jury only swore to who was 
suspected of being guilty of crimes within the locale, not whether the individual was in fact 
guilty.  The determination of guilt was still made through a method such as battle or ordeal.  
LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 50.   
122 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 11, at 72.  One of the earliest jury charges recorded 
in America was in Connecticut in 1823.  CONRAD, supra note 4, at 243.  The charge began, 
“Gentlemen of the jury, look on the prisoner, you that are sworn.”  CONRAD, supra note 4, at 
243.   
123 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *301. 
124 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *270. 
125 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *368. 
126 LIBRARY OF CONG., supra note 13, at 107 (referring to the jury trial in which jurors 
pass judgment “upon their oath” as one of the great rights of Englishmen). 
127 WILLIAM PENN & WILLIAM MEAD, The Tryal of William Penn & William Mead for 
Causing a Tumult (Don C. Seitz ed. Univ. Press 1919) (1719), 
https://archive.org/details/cu31924028831175; see also Ballen, 510 S.E.2d at 227-28. 
128 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 1, line 20. 
129 SIR MATTHEW HALE, History of the Common Law of England 253 (E. & R. Nutt & R. 
Gosling 3rd ed. 1739). 
15
Knudsen: Juror’s Sacred Oath
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
504 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
Adopted from the English common law, in America the jury 
trial featured prominently in colonial events.130  The United States 
Constitution was ratified with specific protections for the trial by ju-
ry,131 with the Bill of Rights further codifying the essential procedural 
protections of both a grand jury in the Fifth Amendment and a petit 
jury in the Sixth Amendment.132 
Though reference to the juror’s oath is absent from the federal 
constitution, colonial jurisprudence regularly referred to it as part of 
standard jury trial procedure.  As early as 1705, Virginia passed an 
assembly statute that provided that the jury was sworn.133  The First 
Continental Congress authorized a letter explaining the rights of Eng-
lishmen, including the “great right” of a trial by jury which “pro-
vides, that neither life, liberty nor property, can be taken from the 
possessor, until twelve of his unexceptionable countrymen . . . upon a 
fair trial . . . shall pass their sentence upon oath against him.”134  As 
part of the procedure for new states to be admitted to the fledgling 
United States, Congress guaranteed that American territories “shall 
always be entitled to the benefits” of a trial by jury and “of judicial 
proceedings according to the course of the common law.”135  The 
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the courts of the United 
States “shall have power to impose and administer all necessary oaths 
or affirmations.”136 While trial transcripts of the time period did not 
record the oath verbatim, they would note that the jury had been “du-
 
130 See, e.g., Boston Massacre Trial, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
http://www.nps.gov/bost/historyculture/massacre-trial.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2016) (de-
scribing John Adams’s defense of Captain Thomas Preston after the Boston Massacre, in 
which a colonial jury returned a verdict of “not guilty” despite the deeply unpopular quarter-
ing of British troops in personal homes). 
131 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
132  United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976) (noting that many of the consti-
tution’s Framers were trained in English common law and were well versed in the history of 
the grand jury as a protection of personal liberty).  “‘Petit’ is the French word for ‘small’; 
petit juries usually consist of twelve jurors in criminal cases and from six to twelve jurors in 
civil cases. ‘Grand’ is the French word for ‘large’; grand juries have from sixteen to twenty-
three jurors.”  Federal Courts and What They Do, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 8 (2006), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/FCtsWhat.pdf/$file/FCtsWhat.pdf. 
133 CONRAD, supra note 4, at 243 (citing CHAPTER XXXII, AN ACT CONCERNING JURIES, 
ACTS OF ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA (1705)). 
134 LIBRARY OF CONG., supra note 13, at 10. 
135 The Avalon Project: Northwest Ordinance; July 13, 1787, YALE LAW SCH., 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). 
136 The Avalon Project: The Judiciary Act; Sept. 24, 1789, YALE LAW SCH., 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/judiciary_act.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). 
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ly sworn.”137 
Thus, despite an absence of statutes specifically dictating a ju-
ry oath, founding documents demonstrate that the oath was consid-
ered to be a basic and essential part of the “great right” to a jury trial. 
2. History: Instructive But Not Dispositive? 
In 1968, the Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to 
an impartial jury in criminal cases and applied it to the states.138  At 
that time, evaluation of what constituted a proper jury trial under Ar-
ticle III and the Sixth Amendment was a straightforward historic in-
quiry: “Was the feature a requisite of the jury trial at common 
law?”139  The Court had consistently held that the Sixth Amendment 
required “a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, 
and include[d] all the essential elements as they were recognized in 
this country and England when the Constitution was adopted.”140  
This definition was “not open to question.”141 
However, in 1970 in Williams v. Florida,142 the Supreme 
Court “upended the conventional wisdom on the Sixth Amend-
ment”143 by holding that the common law requirement of a twelve 
member jury was merely a “historical accident, unrelated to the great 
purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first place.”144  As such, 
courts were not constitutionally bound to follow this “historic acci-
dent,” despite its established presence in the common law.145  The 
Williams decision transformed a straightforward historic inquiry into 
a murky policy question: “Does the feature further the central pur-
pose of the jury trial?”146  This new “inquiry must focus upon the 
function served by the jury in contemporary society.”147  Yet despite 
notable departures from the inflexible common law procedures of ju-
 
137 CONRAD, supra note 4, at 239; Baldwin, 129 U.S. at 55. 
138 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
139 Turrietta, 696 F.3d at 982. 
140 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930). 
141 Id. 
142 399 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1970). 
143 Turrietta, 696 F.3d at 982. 
144 Williams, 399 U.S. at 89-91 (holding that a twelve member jury was not constitutional-
ly required). 
145 Id. at 102. 
146 Turrietta, 696 F.3d at 983. 
147 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972) (holding that a unanimous jury was not 
constitutionally required). 
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ry size and unanimity, the Court has also refused to allow states com-
plete discretion in defining the jury trial.  For example, in 1978, the 
Court affirmed Williams but held that “the purpose and functioning of 
the jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitution-
al degree, by a reduction in size to below six members.”148  And, if a 
jury is composed of the constitutionally required minimum number, 
then it must be unanimous.149 
Prior to Williams, an analysis of the history of the juror’s oath 
as an inherent and incontrovertible part of common law jury trial pro-
cedure would have been the final evaluation.150 However, post-
Williams, courts have applied the “historic accident” reasoning to ju-
ror’s oaths to find that mere presence in the common law tradition is 
insufficient to justify the oath as a constitutional requirement.151  Ex-
plaining that such a constitutional claim “sounds in history rather 
than law,” one circuit court held that it was not “obvious,” due to the 
reasoning of Williams, that an unsworn jury was constitutional error; 
some type of functional analysis was necessary.152 
An inquiry correlating the size of the jury and the requirement 
of swearing the jury is an incomplete application of the Williams de-
cision.  Instead of a sweeping generalization against common law ju-
ry trial procedures, Williams should be read as articulating the com-
monsense requirement that trial procedures still serve the essential 
purpose of the jury trial,153 instead of the Court requiring tradition 
merely for tradition’s sake.154  In Williams the Court simply refused 
to forever codify a feature “incidental to the real purpose of the 
Amendment.”155 
By contrast, unlike the size of a jury, the juror’s oath is more 
than a historical accident—it was integral to the very formation of the 
earliest juries and without it no jury could be legally formed.156  Even 
 
148 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978). 
149 Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979) (“[C]onviction by a nonunanimous six-
member jury in a state criminal trial for a nonpetty offense deprives an accused of his consti-
tutional right to trial by jury.”). 
150 Turrietta, 696 F.3d at 982. 
151 Id. at 981. 
152 Id. (“[W]e are aware of no binding authority, whether in the form of a constitutional 
provision, statute, rule, or judicial decision, addressing whether the Sixth Amendment right 
to trial by jury necessarily requires the jury be sworn.”). 
153 Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. 
154 Id. at 102–03. 
155 Id. at 103. 
156 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 (1993) (“[J]urors . . . commenced their of-
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/4
2016 JUROR’S SACRED OATH 507 
under a post-Williams purpose evaluation, unlike the accidental link 
between the jury trial and requirement of twelve jurors, the “oath is 
bound up with some of the great principles giving rise to the very 
concept of a jury trial” and “reveals a strong relationship to the jury’s 
reliability as a fact finder.”157  Thus, while history is not dispositive 
post-Williams, it is instructive in identifying the purposes and func-
tion of the juror’s oath. 
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Turrietta158 correctly 
identified that jury oaths have a deep history spanning centuries, and 
even acknowledged that historically the jury oath has been inextrica-
bly connected with confidence in the jury’s role as an impartial fact-
finder.159  But then the court applied Williams to hold that because 
history was not dispositive, the oath was not a constitutional require-
ment.160  This is where Turrietta erred.  Looking to common law trial 
procedures is instructive in “reflect[ing] a profound judgment about 
the way in which law should be enforced and justice adminis-
tered.”161  Even though a historical analysis may not control in the 
post-Williams era, the juror’s oath is a procedural requirement of a 
jury trial because of its important constitutional and functional signif-
icance—found in both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
B. The Mythically Impartial Jury 
Both Article III and the Sixth Amendment guarantee a crimi-
nal defendant the right to a jury trial in the state in which the crime 
was committed.162  However, the Sixth Amendment adds the addi-
tional requirement of an “impartial jury.”163  Yet, studies show that 
every person, regardless of his or her background, has some level of 
personal knowledge and potential bias,164 causing one court to note 
 
fice with an oath . . . .”). 
157 United States v. Turrietta, 696 F.3d 972, 981 (10th Cir. 2012) 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 981-83. 
161 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970) (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155); see 
also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993) (noting that the “beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt requirement” was a common-law requirement that has been incorporated 
into constitutional jurisprudence). 
162 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 2. 
163 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 2. 
164 Steve McNally, ‘Unconscious Bias’ and the Perils of Prejudiced Recruiting, MONSTER 
(July 10, 2012), http://www.monster.co.uk/blog/b/unconscious-bias-and-the-perils-of-
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that “[t]he jury system is an institution that is legally fundamental but 
also fundamentally human.”165  Overcoming this inherent challenge 
of bias to provide defendants with their constitutionally protected 
right to an “impartial jury” would be nearly impossible absent some 
procedure for minimizing the effect of juror bias. 
The juror’s oath is an important trial procedure that “is de-
signed to protect the fundamental right of trial by an impartial ju-
ry.”166  “A juror who allows . . . bias to influence assessment of the 
case breaches the [judicial] compact and renounces his or her 
oath.”167  Therefore, “[t]he law presumes, that every juror sworn in 
the case is indifferent and above legal exception.”168 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court confirmed that it is the ju-
ror’s oath, which provides the defendant an impartial jury by obligat-
ing jurors to set aside any previous knowledge or bias.169  In Patton v. 
Yount,170 after a criminal defendant attempted to excuse a juror for 
cause and the trial judge refused, the Supreme Court held that the key 
question was whether the juror swore “that he could set aside any 
opinion he might hold and decide the case on the evidence.”171  Simi-
larly, a year later, in Wainwright v. Witt,172 the Supreme Court held 
that “[t]he proper standard for determining when a prospective juror 
may be excluded for cause . . . is whether the juror’s views would 
‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a ju-
ror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’”173 
Courts have applied the assumption that jurors acting “on 
their oath” will be impartial in a variety of situations.174  For example, 
government employees, in a case in which the government is a party, 
can be unbiased jurors due to their oath.175  The Court explained that 
 
prejudiced-recruiting. 
165 People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 699-700 (Cal. 1990). 
166 Pribble, 249 N.W.2d at 366. 
167 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 153 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
168 United States v. Marchant & Colson, 25 U.S. 480, 482 (1827). 
169 Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 
173 Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)) (emphasis added). 
174 United States v. Rosario, 111 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We presume that jurors 
remain true to their oath and conscientiously observe the instructions and admonitions of the 
court.”); United States v. Carter, 973 F.2d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1992) (“We presume jurors 
will remain true to their oath and conscientiously follow the trial court’s instructions.”). 
175 Dennis, 339 U.S. at 171. 
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while “one may not know or altogether understand the imponderables 
which cause one to think what he thinks . . . one who is trying as an 
honest man to live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to 
say whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter.”176  Even in 
capital punishment cases, jurors with an aversion to the death penalty 
can still render a true verdict upon their oath.177  And, to ensure an 
impartial jury, the court can exhort jurors in a case with widespread 
media coverage to be faithful to their oath.178 
A constitutionally “impartial jury,” as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, is one in which jurors “conscientiously and properly 
carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particu-
lar case,” irrespective of the collective mixture of different back-
grounds, attitudes, and predispositions of the individual jurors.179  
“[T]he juror’s oath is an essential element of the constitutional guar-
antee to a trial by an ‘impartial’ jury.”180  To assume “that jurors are 
so quickly forgetful of the duties of citizenship as to stand continually 
ready to violate their oath on the slightest provocation, [would be to] 
conclude that a trial by jury is a farce and our government a fail-
ure.”181 
C. A Legal and Moral Motivator 
In addition to providing the constitutional presumption of im-
partiality, the juror’s oath provides a legal and moral vehicle for re-
quiring and inspiring jurors to faithfully deliver a verdict in accord 
with the law and the evidence.  The “oath is not only a summary of 
the duties of the jurors, but is also the only security which the State 
 
176 Id. 
177 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (“A man who opposes the death 
penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to 
him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror.”); see also Greene v. Geor-
gia, 519 U.S. 145, 146 (1996) (affirming that Wainwright v. Witt was the federal standard for 
determining when a juror may be excused for cause because of his views on the death penal-
ty). 
178 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976) (recommending that courts will-
ing to consider sequestering the jury because it “insulates jurors only after they are sworn” 
and “emphasizes the elements of the jurors’ oaths”); see, e.g., Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430, 
435 (1887) (holding that the judgment of the court upon a juror’s declaration under oath was 
conclusive when the juror had read about the case in the newspapers but believed himself 
capable of sitting as an impartial juror). 
179 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 183-84. 
180 State v. Godfrey, 666 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 
181 State v. Pepoon, 114 P. 449, 453 (Wash. 1911). 
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and the respondent have for a faithful, fearless discharge of those du-
ties.”182 
Incidents such as the Arkansas Supreme Court reversing a 
death row conviction due to jurors sleeping and tweeting during tri-
al183 reveal the growing threat of juror misconduct184 and the resulting 
societal cost of mistrials.185  Concern over such incidents has inspired 
surveys on what motivates jurors to faithfully perform their duties186 
and generated official recommendations on how judges may best in-
spire conscientious behavior in jurors.187 
Juror misconduct is serious because “[a] talesman, sworn as a 
juror, becomes, like an attorney, an officer of the court, and must 
submit to like restraints.”188  As such, a juror’s “first duty is the ad-
ministration of justice,”189 and the juror’s “oath is administered to in-
sure that the jurors pay attention to the evidence, observe the credibil-
ity and demeanor of the witnesses and conduct themselves at all 
times as befits one holding such an important position.”190  Violation 
 
182 Davis, 52 Vt. at 381. 
183 Jeannie Nuss, Death Row Inmate’s Murder Conviction Overturned Because Juror 
Tweeted in Court, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Dec. 8, 2011, 2:37 PM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/12/08/news/nation/death-row-inmate’s-murder-conviction 
-overturned-because-juror-tweeted-in-court/. 
184 Justin Berton, Courts Crack Down on Facebook Jurors, MONTEREY HERALD NEWS. 
(Dec. 26, 2011 12:01 AM), http://www.montereyherald.com/article/zz/20111226/ 
NEWS/111228592 (“[T]he Google mistrial is becoming a more frequent problem . . . [a 
study] [l]ast year . . . published findings that jurors’ Internet inquiries, blog comments and 
tweets had been cited by attorneys in challenging at least 90 verdicts since 1999. The re-
searchers found that judges had granted new trials or overturned verdicts in 28 additional 
criminal and civil cases in that time - 21 of those from 2008 to 2010.”). 
185 Amanda McGee, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of the 
Internet and its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 306 (2010) 
(noting that the societal costs of juror misconduct are “enormous,” with use of each criminal 
courtroom alone costing thousands of dollars per day). 
186 See generally St. Eve, et al., supra note 90; Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, 
Ensuring An Impartial Jury In The Age Of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2012). 
187 Martha Neil, New Model Jury Instructions Tell Jurors to Turn in Others Who Flout 
Social Media Ban, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 23, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/new_model_jury_instructions_ask_jurors_to_rat_out_others_who_violate_social/.  
The American Bar Association released an official recommendation that judges instruct ju-
rors to report on other jurors’ violations of any of the court’s instructions in order to mini-
mize jurors’ improper use of social media during trial. Id. The judge should tell jurors, “I 
expect you will inform me as soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation of these 
instructions.” Id. 
188 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12 (1933). 
189 JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, THE LAWYER’S OFFICIAL OATH AND OFFICE 6-7 (Boston Book 
Co. 1909) (quoting In re Thomas, 36 F. 242, 243 (C.C.D. Colo. 1888)). 
190 People v. Pribble, 249 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976). 
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of their oath can subject jurors to perjury or contempt proceedings.191  
Swearing a false oath in court can subject the swearer to prosecution 
for perjury.192  The federal penalty for perjury is a fine, imprisonment 
of not more than five years, or both.193  A federal court also has the 
discretionary power to punish by “fine or imprisonment, or both” any 
“contempt of its authority [such as] . . . [d]isobedience or resistance 
to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command,”194 such 
as a violation of jury instructions.195 
Under the Court’s reasoning in using “recent empirical data” 
to determine if a common law jury trial procedure still fulfills an im-
portant constitutional role,196 the juror’s oath should be upheld as a 
requirement because recent studies show that the oath also still car-
ries moral weight in restraining jury behavior, just as it has for centu-
ries.197 
In a recent study on social media usage by jurors, a federal 
district court judge and a state criminal court judge solicited respons-
es from 583 actual jurors to an anonymous questionnaire.198  The re-
sults indicated that two of the most important ethical motivators for 
jurors were a specific judicial instruction against social media usage 
and the moral duty imposed by the juror’s oath.199  In the question-
naire, numerous jurors cited to their oath as influential in why they 
 
191 Julie Manganis, Potential Juror in Rape Case Admits Lying to Judge, SALEM NEWS 
(Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.salemnews.com/news/local_news/potential-juror-in-rape-case-
admits-lying-to-judge/article_e00281a4-8cac-5218-b1ed-7f28a6caef19.html (reporting that a 
juror was sentenced to two years in prison for perjury after lying under oath during voir 
dire); Berton, supra note 184 (“Before trials, California judges will admonish jurors to forgo 
any online research or chatter on Facebook or Twitter. The penalty for ignoring the instruc-
tion will be contempt of court charges, punishable by jail.”). 
192 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2015). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. § 401(3) (2015). 
195 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 10 (1933) (holding that “[c]oncealment or mis-
statement by a juror upon a voir dire examination is punishable as a contempt”); United 
States v. Juror No. One, 866 F. Supp. 2d 442, 449 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that it was con-
tempt for a dismissed juror to send an e-mail with their opinion on the verdict to other jurors 
before the trial finished); People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 4 N.E. 259, 
262-63 (N.Y. 1886) (explaining that the only reason that it was not criminal or civil con-
tempt for a juror to visit the scene of the crime was because there was no statute prohibiting 
it and no court instruction against it). 
196 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232 (1978). 
197 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 90. 
198 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 90. 
199 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 81. 
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obeyed the judge’s instructions: “I took an oath”200; “My oath”201; “I 
follow rules under the oath I made”202; “I knew it was my duty to ful-
fill the oath I took before the court not to say anything”203; “My duty 
as a jur[or] under oath”204; “I took this very seriously and wanted to 
do what I swore I would”205; “I made an oath and was going to follow 
rules under the oath I made.”206  At the conclusion of the study, the 
researchers recommended that “jury instructions should remind the 
jurors of their oath and its importance, and work in references to civic 
pride, respect, and democratic ideals” because “[t]hese concepts res-
onate with jurors.”207 
In contrast to the dangers of a “corrupt or overzealous prose-
cutor and . . . the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge,” the trial by 
jury constitutes an “inestimable safeguard” of the defendant’s 
rights208 because a jury composed of “twelve intelligent and impartial 
men, acting under oath . . . are not likely to do any great wrong.”209 
D. Legally Empowering the Jury 
American culture regularly uses oaths as the defining moment 
that society empowers an individual for public service.  On inaugura-
tion day, the President-elect becomes President and Commander-in-
Chief of the United States in a swearing ceremony on the west front 
of the Capitol building.210  The judge-elect is vested with all of the 
authority of the judicial branch upon taking his oath.211  The senator-
 
200 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 81. 
201 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 81. 
202 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 81. 
203 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 81. 
204 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 81. 
205 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 81. 
206 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 82. 
207 St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 89-90. 
208 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
209 Roberts v. Mason, 210 Ohio St. 277, 280 (1859). 
210 President’s Swearing-In Ceremony, JOINT CONG. COMM. ON INAUGURAL CEREMONIES,            
http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/days-events/days-event/presidents-swearing-in-ceremony; 
see, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential Oath, The American National Interest and a 
Call For Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1, 21 (2004). President McKinley in his First 
Inaugural Address on March 4, 1897, said “by the authority vested in me by this oath, I as-
sume the arduous and responsible duties of President of the United States.” Id. 
211 See, e.g., People ex rel. Holdom v. Sweitzer, 117 N.E. 625, 631 (Ill. 1917) (“[O]ne 
who was declared elected to an office would not assume the duties of such office until his 
commission was issued and he had taken the oath of office.”); Duffy v. Edson, 84 N.W. 264, 
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elect assumes his office and all of the rights and responsibilities per-
taining to it upon taking his oath.212  The law student, after graduating 
law school and passing the bar exam, upon taking his or her oath is 
granted authority as an officer of the court to practice law within the 
designated jurisdiction.213 
Likewise, it is the juror’s oath that transforms a group of indi-
viduals into a jury with legal authority over their peer.214  “[U]ntil a 
jury has been sworn to try the case . . . the twelve individuals in the 
box have no power to convict [the defendant].”215  Properly, no indi-
vidual can be considered a juror unless, “before he shall enter upon 
the discharge of his duties, he . . . take a solemn oath to the effect that 
he will perform his office uprightly and impartially.”216  In fact, cor-
rect language usage would dictate that such individuals are not even 
called “jurors” because prior to the moment that the jury is impaneled 
and sworn, the individuals summoned are called “talesman,” literally 
meaning “a member of a large pool of persons called for jury duty 
from which jurors are selected.”217  Upon being impaneled, an oath 
legally “commences” the office of juror.218  Finally, this oath is re-
quired because a “juror serves in an office of trust” as “an integral 
part of our judicial system,” and in his office the juror “exercises a 
part of the sovereign power of government in the administration of 
justice.”219 
For more than a century, courts across the nation “uniformly 
 
270–71 (Neb. 1900) (“The taking of the constitutional oath by a county judge elect is a con-
dition precedent to his entering upon the duties of such office.”); Mims v. State, 15 S.W.2d 
628, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1929) (“[E]ven when a special judge has been agreed upon or 
rightly appointed, he has no legal power or authority to act until he has taken the oath of of-
fice.”). 
212 Comm. to Recall Menendez v. Wells, 7 A.3d 720, 723 (N.J. 2010) (describing how a 
senator is “officially seated” in the United States Senate after taking the “required oath of 
office”). 
213 President’s Message: Why Are We in This Profession? New Admittees Are Mirrors of 
Ourselves, 33 MONT. LAW. 4 (May 2008) (describing how the author “took the oath at my 
swearing-in ceremony and became a Montana lawyer”); I Do Solemnly Swear: New Admit-
tees Sworn in to the State Bar, 11 NEV. LAW. 16 (2003) (describing the “swearing-in cere-
mony for new admittees to the Bar” as a “momentous occasion”). 
214 Slaughter v. State, 28 S.E. 159, 160 (Ga. 1897). 
215 United States v. Green, 556 F.2d 71, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
216 Slaughter, 28 S.E. at 160. 
217 MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, Talesman, supra note 110; see also State v. Davis, 52 Vt. 
376, 381 (1880) (“[T]rial by an unsworn jury is a mistrial [because it is a] verdict rendered 
by such a body of men . . . [that] cannot be called legal jurors in the case.”). 
218 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 (1993). 
219 Schowgurow v. State, 213 A.2d 475, 478-79 (Md. 1965). 
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held”220 that without being sworn, the jury was not a legally consti-
tuted body capable of passing judgment upon the defendant.221  A 
Georgia court noted that “[m]en summoned as jurors must also be 
sworn before they constitute an organized and competent tribunal to 
which the issues in a cause can be submitted for trial.”222  In Texas, 
“twelve men sitting in judgment, unsworn, do not constitute a jury . . 
. it must be held mandatory that the jury be sworn in a particular 
case.”223  Whether the jury has been sworn is the important considera-
tion to determine if a jury has been properly constituted because trial 
cannot begin “until the jury is sworn.”224  In criminal cases in Ne-
braska, “it is essential to the validity of the proceeding that the jury 
should be sworn.”225  In West Virginia, “[a] person cannot be legally 
convicted unless the record shows that the jury which tried the case 
were sworn according to law.”226  And in California, “[a] conviction 
by an unsworn jury is a nullity.”227 
Even recently courts have held that an unsworn jury “was 
wholly without authority to pass upon any of the issues at trial, and 
therefore, to make any determinations whatsoever regarding guilt or 
innocence,” and concluded that an unsworn jury was “fatally in-
firm.”228  Similar holdings have concluded that an unsworn jury “re-
sults in an invalid conviction”229 and is a “nullity and is reversible er-
ror.”230 
Despite this generally consistent precedent, in the last several 
decades courts have fractured on whether the juror’s oath is necessary 
to legally constitute the jury.231  For example, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals in State v. Vogh232 reasoned that it is a “formalistic view that, 
 
220 State v. Duff, 161 S.W. 683, 685 (Mo. 1913). 
221 Slaughter, 28 S.E. at 161. 
222 Id. 
223 Crisp v. State, 220 S.W. 1104, 1104 (Tex. Crim. 1920). 
224 Slaughter, 28 S.E. at 161. 
225 State v. Martin, 255 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Neb. 1977). 
226 State v. Moore, 49 S.E. 1015, 1016 (W. Va. 1905). 
227 People v. Pelton, 7 P.2d 205, 205 (Cal. App. 1931). 
228 Spencer v. State, 640 S.E.2d 267, 268 (Ga. 2007). 
229 People v. Allan, 829 N.W.2d 319, 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). 
230 Brown v. State, 220 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. App. 2007). 
231 The question of a “legally constituted” jury is separate from any question regarding the 
constitutional necessity of swearing the jury in order to provide the defendant an “impartial 
jury.” As such, it is possible that a court could hold that an oath is not necessary to legally 
form the jury but might still be required as a constitutional right of the defendant. 
232 41 P.3d 421, 425 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
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until sworn, the jury is not ‘lawfully constituted’ and cannot render a 
legal verdict,”233 and that such “formalism has since given way to a 
more functional approach.”234 And in State v. Arellano, the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico held that there was no error in the verdict of an 
improperly sworn jury because: 
The jury understood the spirit of the oath and purpose 
of the jury selection process as emphasized in the voir 
dire procedures and jury instructions . . . The purpose 
of administering the oath to jurors is to ensure that the 
jurors conduct themselves at all times as befits one 
holding such an important position . . . [A]ny oath or 
affirmation that awakens the juror’s conscience and 
impresses his or her mind with their duty will suf-
fice.235 
Despite the seeming logic of the “functional” approach, it is 
an incomplete analysis to claim that the oath does not fulfill one pur-
pose (legally empowering the jury) merely because it does fill anoth-
er purpose (such as impressing upon the jury the solemnity of their 
duty).  The oath analysis is not a zero sum game.  If an oath impress-
es upon the jurors the solemnity of their duty, that does not preclude 
the oath from also being the act that legally empowers that group of 
people as a judicial body capable of passing judgment upon their 
peer.  And, if members of the group realize the solemnity of the occa-
sion even absent the oath, that likewise does not add or detract from 
the separate function of the oath in constituting the jury as a legal 
body.  Finally, if it is not the oath which provides the legal moment in 
which society empowers the jury as a legal fact-finding body, it is 
unclear when, or even if, the jury is granted such authority.236 
E. The Magical Moment When Jeopardy Attaches 
If the oath identifies the definitive moment that the jury is le-
gally empowered to try the case, it also identifies that at the same 
 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 426. 
235 965 P.2d 293, 295 (N.M. 1998). 
236 The creation of the jury as a legal body at the moment of the oath is clearer in pre-
scribed oath jurisdictions because of their statutes. However, even in traditional jurisdiction 
there is no other definable moment that the jury is legally formed other than the moment of 
the jurors taking the oath. 
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moment jeopardy attaches to the defendant.237  Sir William Black-
stone wrote that the common law autrefois acquit plea is the “univer-
sal maxim of the common law of England that no man is to be 
brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same of-
fence.”238  Codifying the common law pleas,239 the Fifth Amendment 
states that no person shall “be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb.”240  Jeopardy is defined as “[t]he risk of conviction and pun-
ishment that a criminal defendant faces at trial,”241 with the Double 
Jeopardy Clause protecting against a second prosecution after either 
an acquittal or a conviction and against multiple punishments for the 
same offense.242  This protection against successive prosecutions 
serves as “a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s bene-
fit.”243  The rationale behind the Double Jeopardy Clause was most 
famously explained by Justice Black in 1957: 
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not 
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting 
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity as well as enhancing the possibility that 
even though innocent he may be found guilty.244 
In 1969, the Supreme Court declared that “the double jeopardy pro-
hibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in 
our constitutional heritage” and applies “to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”245 
As a concept “rooted in history”246 and applicable to both fed-
 
237 Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978) (“[J]eopardy attaches when the jury is empan-
eled and sworn”); United States v. Little Dog, 398 F.3d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that it was error to not swear the jury due to the attachment of jeopardy). 
238 IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *329. 
239 Autrefois Acquit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“Double jeopardy” is a 
generic name for both “previous acquittal” and “previous conviction.”). 
240 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 2. 
241 Jeopardy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
242 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). 
243 Id. 
244 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
245 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
246 Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392 (1958) (holding that double jeopardy “is 
rooted in history and is not an evolving concept like due process”). 
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eral and state court systems,247 identification of the moment that 
jeopardy attaches is important to trial procedure because it deter-
mines the precise instant after which the defendant may never be re-
prosecuted on the same claim, regardless of ultimate conviction or 
acquittal.248  The timing evaluation “serves as the lynchpin for all 
double jeopardy jurisprudence.”249  In a jury trial, “[t]here are few if 
any rules of criminal procedure clearer than the rule that ‘jeopardy 
attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn.’”250  Jeopardy may 
attach even if the case ends without a final judgment, such as when a 
jury was sworn but dismissed before hearing any evidence.251  In 
2014, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this “bright-line rule,” explain-
ing that “a jury trial begins, and jeopardy attaches, when the jury is 
sworn.”252 
The jeopardy evaluation is necessarily problematic when 
there is error in swearing the jury. If the defendant is convicted and 
appeals, courts have applied a harmless error analysis to hold that the 
unsworn jury is able to convict the defendant.253  Conversely, an un-
sworn jury would seem to be able to acquit under the general rule that 
an acquittal may never be reviewed “on error or otherwise.”254  How-
ever, unique to the error of an unsworn jury, if “jeopardy” never at-
tached, prosecutors have argued that an acquittal by an unsworn jury 
is a “nullity.”255  And, in Spencer v. State,256 the Georgia Supreme 
 
247 Benton, 395 U.S. at 794. 
248 Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978). 
249 Id. 
250 Martinez v. Illinois, 134 S. Ct. 2070, 2074 (2014) (quoting Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 
35 (1978)). 
251 Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 (1963) (holding that jeopardy attached 
once the first jury was sworn and, therefore, impanelling a second jury violated defendant’s 
right against double jeopardy). 
252 Martinez, 134 S. Ct. at 2075 (“We have never suggested . . . that jeopardy may not 
have attached where, under the circumstances of a particular case, the defendant was not 
genuinely at risk of conviction. Martinez was subjected to jeopardy because the jury in his 
case was sworn.”). 
253 United States v. Turrietta, 696 F.3d 972, 976 n.9 (10th Cir. 2012). 
254 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896). 
255 Brief of Appellee by the District Attorney at 1, Spencer v. State, 640 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. 
2007) (No. So6A1719), 2006 WL 4550855, at 1. (“Summary of the Argument: Jeopardy 
does not attach until a jury is empaneled and sworn. The first jury was not sworn, so the first 
trial was a nullity; and the collective judgment of the unsworn 12 was not a verdict but also a 
mere nullity. Consequently, no acquittal resulted from a void jury’s null and void deci-
sion.”). 
256 40 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. 2007). 
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Court agreed.257  The court held that the prosecution could re-
prosecute a claim on which the defendant had been previously acquit-
ted by an unsworn jury, reasoning that because “jeopardy does not at-
tach in a jury trial until the jury is both impaneled and sworn . . . . 
Spencer was not placed in jeopardy at all, regardless of the attempted 
trial and the pronouncements of the fatally infirm jury.”258  The D.C. 
Circuit Court has similarly allowed re-prosecution of a defendant af-
ter the first jury had been empaneled but dismissed before being 
sworn, concluding that “a defendant is not placed in jeopardy until he 
is subjected to the risk of being convicted.”259  That risk of conviction 
“cannot arise until a jury has been sworn to try the case; until that 
moment, a defendant is subject to no jeopardy, for the twelve indi-
viduals in the box have no power to convict him.”260 
To allow an unsworn jury the power to convict under a theory 
of harmless error but not to allow the unsworn jury to acquit because 
jeopardy never attached undermines the intended protection of the 
Double Jeopardy provision.  A properly sworn jury is an implied con-
stitutional requirement under the Fifth Amendment, giving equal pro-
tection to the defendant regardless of whether the jury acquits or con-
victs. 
III. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A JURY IS NOT PROPERLY SWORN? 
A. Five Irregularities in the Swearing Process 
There are five potential irregularities that may occur in swear-
ing the jury: (1) the oath is unrecorded or improperly recorded, (2) 
the jury is sworn late, (3) the jury is sworn improperly, (4) the jury is 
only partially sworn, and (5) the jury is not sworn. 
1. The Unrecorded Oath 
Despite nearly all courtroom trial proceedings being “on the 
record” with a court reporter taking dictation, jury oaths are generally 
not recorded verbatim, the record merely noting that the jury was 
 
257 Id. at 268. 
258 Id. 
259 United States v. Green, 556 F.2d 71, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rejecting the defendant’s 
double jeopardy claim on the basis that the first jury was never sworn.). 
260 Id. 
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“duly sworn.”261  Under such procedures, perhaps the simplest jury 
oath error is the unrecorded or improperly recorded oath. 
For example, according to the record, in United States v. Pi-
nero,262 a jury was selected and impaneled but not immediately 
sworn.263  The following day the court heard arguments on a motion 
to suppress.264  Finally, on the third day, the jury was brought in and 
the trial commenced.265  The defendants appealed because the trial 
record never indicated that the jury oath was administered.266  The 
Eleventh Circuit held that the issue was factual, and as a matter of 
law, “[t]he mere absence of an affirmative statement in the record . . . 
[was] not enough to establish that the jury was not in fact sworn.”267  
Under the presumption of regularity, courts also presume that the 
proper language has been used when the record does reflect that the 
jury has been sworn.268 
The presumption of regularity helps thwart frivolous claims of 
an unrecorded oath, such as in United States v. Gibson.269  After be-
ing convicted of passing multiple forged postal money orders with in-
tent to defraud, the defendant appealed pro se, claiming that an un-
sworn jury had tried him.270  The court, in dismissing his claim, held 
 
261 See, e.g., Trial Transcript, United States v. Guevara, 96 Fed. Appx. 745 (2d Cir. 2004), 
(No. 02-1104), 2001 WL 36133508 (N.D.N.Y.) (“Whereupon a jury was duly selected and 
sworn”); Trial Transcript, Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2001), (No. 00-1127), 
1999 WL 34872401 (E.D.Va.) (“Thereupon, the jury panel was sworn and examined on voir 
dire, and from said panel present came a jury of seven who were duly sworn to try the is-
sues.”); Trial Transcript, Tariq v. Ramirez, 2006 WL 6649107 (Md. Cir. Ct.) (noting that 
“the jury panel was duly sworn”); Plaintiff Angel Mercado’s Opening Statement, Mercado v. 
Manny’s T.V. and Appliance, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 979 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010), (No. 09-P-520), 
2007 WL 7297705 (Mass. Super.) (noting in a parenthetical that “[t]he jury was duly 
sworn.”); Trial Transcript, Sims v. Precision Hydraulic Services Co., 2002 WL 34443721 
(Pa. Com. Pl.) (noting in a parenthetical “Jury Panel Duly Sworn”). 
  Historically, the jury verdict would also reaffirm the jury’s original oath by stating, for 
example, “We, the jury duly impaneled, charged and sworn, in the above entitled action, do, 
on our oath, find the defendant . . . guilty of murder in the first degree.” Baldwin v. Kansas, 
129 U.S. 52, 56 (1889) (emphasis added). 
262 948 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1991). 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 699. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Pinero, 948 F.2d at 700. 
268 See Baldwin v. Kansas, 129 U.S. 52, 56 (1889). 
269 See United States v. Gibson, 462 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1972). 
270 Gibson, 462 F.2d at 401. 
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that the allegations were meritless.271 
2. The Tardily Sworn Jury 
The second type of error in swearing the jury occurs when the 
jury is not sworn immediately after being empanelled and before 
opening statements. Courts have evaluated belated oaths at points all 
throughout the trial process, such as swearing the jury after opening 
statements but before the presentation of any evidence,272 swearing 
the jury after the state’s first witness,273 swearing the jury after five 
witnesses had testified,274 swearing the jury after the prosecution’s 
case-in-chief,275 swearing the jury after conclusion of the trial but be-
fore substantive jury deliberations,276 and swearing the jury after de-
liberations had begun but before a verdict was announced.277  In one 
case, two weeks after the trial had been completed a defendant re-
quested that his jury be reassembled, officially sworn, and “sent back 
to deliberate a second time.”278  The court refused.279 
3. The Improperly Sworn Jury 
A jury is improperly sworn when the jury is not given the ex-
act wording of the oath prescribed by statute or tradition, or the pro-
cedure for swearing the jury is improperly followed.280  Examples in-
clude when a statute prescribes specific oath language but the record 
only shows a partial recitation of the oath, leaving off important ele-
ments such as “according to the law and the evidence,”281 jurors be-
ing given the wrong oath prior to trial, such as the voir dire oath in-
stead of the trial oath,282 or swearing procedures being improperly 
followed, such as the defendant not being present to observe the jury 
 
271 Id. 
272 Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628, 629 (8th Cir. 1979). 
273 Hollis v. People, 630 P.2d 68, 69-70 (Colo. 1981). 
274 State v. Frazier, 98 S.W.2d 707, 715 (Mo. 1936). 
275 United States v. Hopkins, 458 F.2d 1353, 1354 (5th Cir. 1972). 
276 State v. Godfrey, 666 P.2d 1080, 1081-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 
277 Brown v. State, 220 S.W.3d 552, 553 (Tex. App. 2007). 
278 State v. Vogh, 41 P.3d 421, 423 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
279 Id. at 429. 
280 Baldwin v. Kansas, 129 U.S. 52, 54 (1889). 
281 Id. at 54-55. 
282 Defendant-Appellant’s Brief Opposing Application for Leave to Appeal at 4, People v. 
Cain, No. 149259 (Mich. 2014). 
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being sworn.283 
4. The Partially Sworn Jury 
Despite all of the procedural rules and the best amount of 
preparation, unexpected occurrences still happen in trials.284  One 
such instance occurred in People v. Clemmons285 when a trial court 
properly swore the jury but then dismissed one of the jurors because 
he declared that he could not be impartial.286  The defendant refused 
to continue the trial with only eleven jurors, and so the court declared 
a mistrial.287  Instead of selecting a completely new jury for the se-
cond trial, the court brought back eleven of the original jurors.288  The 
court subsequently excused another juror, bringing the number of ju-
rors to ten.289  Two new jurors were then selected and sworn, and as a 
result, only two of the twelve jurors were sworn to try the new 
case.290 
5. The Unsworn Jury 
The clearest instance of swearing error is when the jury is 
never given the pre-trial oath at any point during trial.  A classic ex-
ample of such error is Harris v. State,291 in which after a morning of 
voir dire and selection of the jury panel, the judge dismissed the ju-
rors for an early lunch.292  When the jury returned, the trial began 
without the jurors being sworn.293  At various points throughout the 
trial, the clerk and defense counsel inquired about swearing the ju-
rors.294  Additionally, the clerk noted on the docket that the jurors 
 
283 United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1359 (6th Cir. 1984). 
284 Stephen D. Easton, Cameras In Courtrooms: Contrasting Viewpoints: Whose Life Is It 
Anyway?: A Proposal to Redistribute Some of the Economic Benefits of Cameras in the 
Courtroom from Broadcasters to Crime Victims, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (explaining that 
real, live courtrooms contain “suspense, mystery, and high drama”). 
285 442 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 




290 Clemons, 442 N.W.2d at 720. 
291 956 A.2d 204 (Md. 2008). 
292 Id. at 206. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 209. 
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were not sworn and prosecuting counsel, while responding to defense 
counsel’s other arguments, ignored objections to the jury being un-
sworn.295  At the conclusion of trial, defendant was convicted of ve-
hicular manslaughter and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment.296  
Defendant appealed his conviction based on the unsworn jury, and 
the conviction was ultimately reversed on that ground.297 
B. Is an Improperly Sworn Jury Reversible Error? 
Similar to most legal errors, the effect of an improperly sworn 
jury depends on how quickly it was noticed and brought to the court’s 
attention.  For error to be reversible, it must be preserved for appeal 
and be prejudicial, not harmless error.298  The only way for unpre-
served error to be reversed on appeal is “plain,” meaning that the er-
ror affected the defendant’s substantial rights.299  
1. Was There Error? 
Under both a preserved error and plain error analysis, the first 
question is whether there was error.  There is presumptively no error 
in an unrecorded oath300 and no error in an improperly sworn jury as 
long as there was “substantial compliance” with the oath.301  Howev-
er, by contrast, if a jury is only partially sworn, belatedly sworn, or 
not sworn at all then it is error.302 
More than a century ago, in Baldwin v. Kansas,303 the Su-
preme Court addressed both the unrecorded oath and a substantially 
compliant oath.304  The Court held that the record does not need to 
give the exact wording of the juror’s oath, “especially in view of the 
statement in the journal entry that the jurors were ‘duly’ sworn.”305  
Instead, once the oath has been noted on the record without any at-
 
295 Id. 
296 Harris, 956 A.2d at 206. 
297 956 A.2d at 207-08. 
298 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
299 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
300 129 U.S. at 55. 
301 Id. 
302 United States v. Little Dog, 398 F.3d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t was error not to 
administer the oath to the jurors before the beginning of the trial.”). 
303 129 U.S. 52 (1889). 
304 Id. at 55. 
305 Id. 
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tempt to give its language verbatim, the “presumption will be that the 
oath was correctly administered.”306  This presumption continues, 
with the Eleventh Circuit noting that “mere absence of an affirmative 
statement in the record, however, is not enough to establish that the 
jury was not in fact sworn.”307  Also, the Maryland Supreme Court 
noted that the “presumption of regularity applies to the issue of 
whether a jury has been sworn.”308  Finally, if an improperly sworn 
jury is given an oath in “substantial compliance” with statutory lan-
guage or is given an oath that includes all of the essential elements, 
such as rendering a “true verdict” in accord with the “law and the ev-
idence,”309 any error is harmless because the oath is still “obligatory 
and binding.”310  To be valid, the oath must only be administered 
“substantially in the manner prescribed by law.”311 
However, the basic requirement that the jury be somehow 
sworn at the beginning of trial, either presumptively or substantially, 
necessitates that it is error for a jury to be only partially sworn, belat-
edly sworn, or not sworn at all.312  As outlined above, error occurs 
because historically “juror” means someone who is “sworn,”313 a 
sworn jury is necessary for the constitutional presumption of an im-
partial jury,314 the oath legally and morally motivates jurors,315 the 
oath legally creates the jury,316 and the oath identifies the moment 
that jeopardy attaches.317 
2. Was the Error Prejudicial or Structural? 
The second question in a reversible error analysis is whether 
 
306 Id. 
307 United States v. Pinero, 948 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1991). 
308 Montgomery v. State, 47 A.3d 1140, 1148 (Md. 2012); State v. Mayfield, 109 S.E.2d 
716, 724 (S.C. 1959) (“Absence of affirmative statement in the transcript that the jury was 
sworn furnishes no factual support for appellant’s contention that it was not.”). 
309 Baldwin, 129 U.S. at 55. 
310 Preston v. State, 90 S.W. 856, 856 (Tenn. 1905) (holding that a jury that was not sworn 
with the proper procedure was still binding). 
311 Baldwin, 129 U.S. at 55. 
312 Little Dog, 398 F.3d at 1036. 
313 DICTIONARY.COM, Juror, supra note 10. 
314 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 183-84 (1986). 
315 State v. Davis, 52 Vt. 376, 381 (1880). 
316 United States v. Green, 556 F.2d 71, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
317 Martinez v. Illinois, 134 S. Ct. 2070, 2074 (2014) (holding that jeopardy attaches at the 
oath). 
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the error was prejudicial or harmless.318  Generally, an appellate court 
may not reverse if the error was harmless to the outcome of the tri-
al.319  Errors may be either “trial” errors or “structural” errors.320  A 
trial error is an error during the trial that can be quantitatively as-
sessed by a jury “in the context of other evidence presented.”321  Trial 
errors are subject to a harmless error analysis,322 in which the test is 
whether it is “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”323 
Courts almost unanimously hold that that there was harmless 
error when a jury has been belatedly sworn.324  One court explained 
that “the apparent majority view [is] that a failure to swear the jury 
until the case has commenced is generally harmless error, at least, 
where there is no actual prejudice shown and the oath is administered 
prior to deliberations.”325  This holding seems to be consistent across 
the decades326 and among jurisdictions.327 
In contrast to trial errors, structural errors are errors in the 
mechanism or framework of the trial328 that make the trial either 
“fundamentally unfair” or an “unreliable vehicle for determining guilt 
or innocence.”329  Structural errors defy a harmless error analysis.330  
While few situations reach the stringent standard of structural er-
 
318 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
319 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2015). 
320 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
321 Id. at 307–08. 
322 Id. 
323 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999). 
324 State v. Godfrey, 666 P.2d 1080, 1081 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 
325 Id. 
326 Little Dog, 398 F.3d at 1036-37 (“In the absence of prejudice caused by the delay in 
administering the oath, the error is harmless.”); Fedd v. State, 680 S.E.2d 453, 456 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2009) (holding that belated oath subject to harmless error analysis); Stark v. State, 97 
So. 577, 577 (Miss. 1923) (holding that swearing three members of the jury after the state’s 
case-in-chief was harmless error); State v. Frazier, 98 S.W.2d 707, 716 (Mo. 1936) (holding 
that if the jurors are “sworn during the progress of the trial and before they had begun to de-
liberate” the error is harmless). 
327 Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628, 629 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that delayed swearing 
did not prejudice defendant’s “rights to a jury trial, fair trial or due process”); United States 
v. Hopkins, 458 F.2d 1353, 1354 (5th Cir.1972) (evaluating belated oath for prejudice to de-
fendant); Hollis v. People, 630 P.2d 68, 70 (Colo. 1981) (holding that “late administration of 
the jury oath by the trial court was harmless error”). 
328 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309; Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986) (internal ci-
tations omitted). 
329 Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 160 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
330 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309. 
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ror,331 examples include deprivation of the assistance of counsel332 
and trial before a biased judge.333 
In Sullivan v. Louisiana334 the Supreme Court held that a con-
stitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt jury instruction was structural 
error, not subject to a harmless error analysis, for two reasons: (1) be-
cause of the centrality of the reasonable-doubt instruction to the va-
lidity of the jury verdict and (2) because denial of the proper instruc-
tion was a non-quantifiable procedural error.335  Similar to the 
deficient jury instruction, the centrality of the oath to the formation of 
the jury and the inability to quantify the impact of the error indicate 
that an unsworn jury should be categorized as structural error.  To 
hold that failure to swear the complete jury is a mere trial error, and 
not a structural error, would require the jury to be able to evaluate the 
swearing error in the overall context of the trial proceedings.336  Be-
cause one of the very issues is whether the jury itself has been legally 
formed, it would be absurd to claim that the jury in question could 
decide its own legitimacy.  Consistent with the understanding that 
failure to swear the complete jury panel is structural error, even 
courts that willingly hold a belated oath to a harmless error standard 
“have no hesitation in finding reversible error [for an unsworn jury] 
even absent any showing of actual prejudice.”337  An unsworn jury is 
structural error affecting the framework within which the trial pro-
ceeds that requires no showing of prejudice to the defendant.338 
 
331 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (explaining that federal courts only find 
structural error in a “very limited class of cases”). 
332 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
333 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
334 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
335 Id. at 281. 
336 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08. 
337 State v. Godfrey, 666 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 
338 Harris v. State, 956 A.2d 204, 213 (Md. 2008). A “complete failure to swear the jury 
can never be harmless error” because a “jury which has never been sworn falls into the same 
‘structural error’ category as a defective reasonable doubt instruction, the denial of a right to 
a jury trial, the total deprivation of counsel, discrimination in the selection of juries, etc.” Id.  
 However, while an unsworn jury defies a harmless error analysis upon direct appeal, a 
challenge to the sufficiency of an unsworn jury through a habeas petition in federal court 
under a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim still requires a showing of 
prejudice. Frashuer v. Clipper, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39767, 2012 WL 1004767 (N.D. Ohio 
2012).  Unlike a facial challenge to an unsworn jury as structural error, bringing a claim over 
counsel’s failure to object to the unsworn jury requires a showing of prejudice as part of the 
constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984) (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
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3. Was the Error Preserved for Appeal?
When a jury is either partially sworn or not sworn at all, “it is 
incumbent upon the defense to raise an objection . . . at trial or risk 
waiving the issue on appeal.”339  Due to the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule, if the error is not objected to at trial it generally has been 
forfeited on appeal.340  The only exception, in which a court may re-
verse for unpreserved error, is when an appellate court conducts a 
discretionary review for plain error.341 
If a jury has not been sworn and an objection is timely raised, 
the trial court has the ability to quickly address the issue by immedi-
ately swearing in the jury.  Additionally, “if the form of the oath was 
defective, the attention of the court should have been called to it at 
the time the oath was taken, so that it might have been corrected.”342  
As already noted, a correct but belated oath is mere harmless error.343  
As such, a situation is very unlikely in which an objection has been 
properly preserved but the trial court did not address it.  Were such a 
situation to occur, it would constitute preserved structural error, and 
the case would be subject to automatic reversal.344 
Finally, due to the ease of fixing such an error at the trial 
court level after a proper objection, knowingly withholding objection 
to an unsworn jury in the hope of reversal on appeal,345 waives the 
objection.346  “A party cannot sit silently by and take the chance of 
ent.”); Lamar v. Hetzel, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78093 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (“That is, the error 
must be so serious ‘as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.’ Here . . . [t]here is no showing 
that an unsworn jury somehow impacted the result of his trial.”). 
339 People v. Abadia, 767 N.E.2d 341, 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
340 FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009) (requiring a 
contemporaneous objection to preserve an issue for appeal). 
341 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). 
342 Baldwin v. Kansas, 129 U.S. 52, 56 (1889). 
343 See supra notes 302-04. 
344 Harris v. State, 956 A.2d 204, 213 (Md. 2008). A “complete failure to swear the jury 
can never be harmless error” because a “jury which has never been sworn falls into the same 
‘structural error’ category as a defective reasonable doubt instruction, the denial of a right to 
a jury trial, the total deprivation of counsel, discrimination in the selection of juries, etc.” Id.  
345 Turrietta, 696 F.3d at 986; Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1956) 
(holding that oath error was waived by counsel knowing but not objecting); State v. Arella-
no, 965 P.2d 293, 296 (N.M. 1998) (holding that defense counsel waived right to a sworn 
jury when “counsel knew of the defect in the proceedings and the right of a sworn jury, yet 
engaged in gamesmanship, waiting to see the result of the verdict before notifying the 
court”). Cf. State v. Davis, 52 Vt. 376, 382 (1880) (holding that the right to a properly sworn 
jury may not be waived by silence). 
346 Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 (“Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the 
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acquittal, and subsequently, when convicted, make objections to an 
irregularity in the form of the oath.”347  In United States v. Turrietta, 
despite inaccurately reasoning that the unsworn jury might not be 
constitutional error, the Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that the 
“crucial fact” was that defense counsel knew that the jury was not 
sworn, but chose not to object.348  “Under these circumstances, the 
failure to make a contemporaneous objection was a matter of strate-
gy, not neglect, and constituted consent to proceed with an unsworn 
jury.”349 
The only exception to the requirement that error be preserved 
for appeal is a plain error analysis.350  Plain error requires: (1) a 
showing of error; (2) a showing that the error was plain; and (3) a 
showing that the plain error affected substantial rights.351  If these 
threshold elements are met, in the appellate court’s discretion, it may 
correct an error that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings,”352 such as when an innocent de-
fendant is wrongly convicted.353  However, because a plain error re-
view is discretionary, a threshold showing of error affecting substan-
tial rights does not require reversal.354  Due to the discretionary 
nature of the review, courts disfavor a plain error analysis and only 
apply it in limited circumstances.355  For this reason, “a defect in the 
administration of the oath cannot rise to the level of ‘plain error.’”356 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly ninety-five percent of the world’s jury trials occur in 
 
failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right.’ ”). 
347 Baldwin, 129 U.S. at 56. 
348 Id. at 986 (Kelly, J., concurring). 
349 Id. 
350 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
351 United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 
520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)). 
352 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 
297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). 
353 Id. at 736. 
354 Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (noting that if the first three parts of the plain error analysis 
are satisfied, the appellate court “has the discretion to remedy the error”). 
355 Id. at 134-35 (“If an error is not properly preserved, appellate-court authority to reme-
dy the error . . . is strictly circumscribed. . . . Meeting all four prongs [of the plain error anal-
ysis] is difficult, ‘as it should be.’”). 
356 Ex parte Borden, 769 So. 2d 950, 955 (Ala. 2000). 
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the United States.357  Each year an estimated 32 million people are 
summoned for jury service.358  Of those summoned, nearly 1.5 mil-
lion individuals are impaneled to serve359 in one of the 154,000 esti-
mated jury trials per year.360  One court described such jury service as 
“a high duty of citizenship” in the “maintenance of law, order, and in 
the administration of justice.”361  Jurors themselves described serving 
on a jury as an “awesome responsibility”362 and “personally reward-
ing.”363 
Both the defendant and society have an interest and expecta-
tion in having these juries properly sworn—a juror by historic defini-
tion is someone who is sworn, an “impartial” jury is one that can ful-
fill its oath, the oath is a legal and moral motivator for jurors, 
swearing the jury legally constitutes the jury with the powers of their 
office, and the oath is the moment that jeopardy attaches.  The essen-
tial elements of the oath include impressing upon the jurors their sa-
cred duty to render a “true verdict” in accordance with the law and 
the evidence.  However, courts inconsistently handle irregularities in 
administration of the oath such as the unrecorded oath, the belated 
oath, the improper oath, the partially sworn jury, and the unsworn ju-
ry. 
For these reasons, courts should uniformly hold364 that the ju-
 
357 Jury Information, COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.co.us/Jury/ 
Index.cfm (last visited Apr. 19, 2016). 
358 D. Graham Burnett, A Juror’s Role, 14 EJOURNAL USA 7, 8 (2009). 
359 Id. at 8. 
360 Fred Graham, American Juries, 14 EJOURNAL USA 4, 6 (2009). 
361 Guide to Jury Service, LANCASTER CNTY, PENN., CT. OF COMMON PLEAS, https://pa-
lancastercountycourts.civicplus.com/136/Jury-Services (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
362 Mary Angell, A Juror’s Oath, A Juror’s Responsibility, THE WYO. LAW., Apr. 2007, at 
32. 
363 See St. Eve et al. , supra note 90, at 89. Two judges after completing a survey of jurors 
explained that while “[s]ome may cringe at the prospect of jury duty, . . . in our experience, 
nearly all who serve take their obligation seriously and find the experience personally re-
warding.” See St. Eve et al., supra note 90, at 89.  
364 It is important for Federal Circuit Courts and the United States Supreme Court to pro-
vide a clear precedent because district courts have denied that defendants have a constitu-
tional right to a properly sworn jury due to the lack of a clear precedential ruling on this is-
sue. See, e.g., Anderson v. Rapelje, No. 2:11-14825, 2012 WL 2720165, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 
July 9, 2012) (reasoning that “there is no Supreme Court precedent which establishes a fed-
eral constitutional right that requires a state trial court to administer an oath to an empaneled 
jury”); Pinkney v. Senkowski, No. 03Civ.4820, 2006 WL 3208595, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 
2006) (evaluating a habeas petition claiming an improperly sworn jury and concluding that 
the “[defendant’s] claims, even if true, do not implicate a violation of a constitutional right 
or of federal law”); Rodriguez v. Brown, No. 11-CV-1246, 2011 WL 4073748, at *10 
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ry oath is essential to legally form the jury,365 and is constitutionally 
required as part of a jury trial under the Fifth Amendment for purpos-
es of double jeopardy366 and under the Sixth Amendment to create the 
“impartial” jury.367  Additionally, tradition-based jurisdictions should 
codify their oath to clarify the procedural necessity of the juror’s 
oath. 
If an oath is not properly administered at trial and counsel 
raises an objection to the irregularity with the oath, the trial court 
may either grant a mistrial or properly swear the jury at the time of 
the objection, provided that the jury has not yet left to deliberate.  If 
no objection is made at trial, the claim of error is forfeited on appeal.  
If counsel knew about the error and chose not to object, the error was 
waived and may not serve as a basis on appeal.368  Due to the ease of 
correction at the trial court, such error does not rise to the level of 
plain error.  However, the rare occurrence of a properly preserved ob-
jection to an unsworn jury is structural error necessitating automatic 
reversal on appeal regardless of a showing of prejudice. 
The juror’s “oath is administered to insure that the jurors pay 
attention to the evidence, observe the credibility and demeanor of the 
witnesses and conduct themselves at all times as befits one holding 
such an important position.”369  The judicial system should ensure 
that these jurors are properly equipped, both legally and morally, 
through their oath to assume their temporary but significant societal 
office. 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011) (holding that “[b]ecause there is no federal statutory or constitu-
tional” requirement to a sworn jury, the defendant was not entitled to habeas relief for a de-
fectively sworn jury). 
365 United States v. Green, 556 F.2d 71, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
366 Martinez v. Illinois, 134 S. Ct. 2070, 2074 (2014) (jeopardy attaches at the oath). 
367 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 183-84 (1986); State v. Davis, 52 Vt. 376, 381 
(1880). 
368 United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1358 (6th Cir. 1984). 
369 People v. Pribble, 249 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976). 
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